Modality, Weights, and Inconsistent Premise Sets by Silk, Alex
 
 
University of Birmingham
Modality, Weights, and Inconsistent Premise Sets
Silk, Alex
DOI:
10.1093/jos/ffx014
License:
None: All rights reserved
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Silk, A 2017, 'Modality, Weights, and Inconsistent Premise Sets', Journal of Semantics, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 683-
707. https://doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffx014
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Semantics following peer review. The
version of record Alex Silk; Modality, Weights and Inconsistent Premise Sets, Journal of Semantics, Volume 34, Issue 4, 1 November 2017,
Pages 683–707 is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffx014
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
Modality, Weights, and
Inconsistent Premise Sets*
Alex Silk
University of Birmingham
Abstract
It is a commonplace that some of our desires are stronger than others; that
certain values and norms are more important than others; and that states of
affairs can bemore likely than others. Some authors have claimed that the clas-
sic premise semantics for modals in linguistic semantics fails to capture how
the truth-conditions of modal sentences can be sensitive to such differences
in strength and priority. I develop an interpretation of the classic premise se-
mantic framework that captures various ways in which weights and priorities
can affect the interpretation of modals. Modals, on the standard semantics,
receive their interpretation from contextually supplied functions from worlds
to premise sets (“conversational backgrounds”). I propose that we understand
these functions as encoding the content of an intuitively relevant body of con-
siderations (conditional norms, preferences, expectations, etc.). The result-
ing world-indexed premise sets that figure in the truth-conditions of modal
sentences represent what follows from these considerations given the relevant
circumstances in the evaluation world. Facts about weights and priorities are
encoded not in the individual premise sets (or in additional operations de-
fined on them), but in howpremise sets are assigned across worlds by the given
conversational background. Next I offer one way of extending the account to
certain comparative modal sentences. The proposed analysis captures various
inference patterns involving modal auxiliaries, comparatives, and equatives,
improving on certain previous approaches to gradedmodality within the clas-
sic framework. The paper concludes with several theoretical reflections on the
relation between the semantics of modals and the logic of weights and priori-
ties. The account developed in this paper locates a crucial role for research on
proper reasoning involving weights and priorities without building the find-
ings of this research into the conventional meaning of modal language.
*Apreliminary version of certain ideas in this paper can be found inA.Chereches (Ed.), Semantics
and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 22, 43–64, §3. Thanks to two anonymous referees for the Journal of
Semantics for comments. Thanks also to Fabrizio Cariani, Kai von Fintel, Irene Heim, Ezra Keshet,
Dan Lassiter, Bob Stalnaker, Eric Swanson, and participants at SALT 22 and DEON 2014. Partial
support for this work comes from the Arts and Humanities Research Council, Early Career Research
grant “Context-Sensitivity in Natural Language” Ref: AH/N001877/1 (Co-I Daniel Rothschild).
1 Introduction
It is a commonplace that some of our desires are stronger than others; that certain
values, norms, and rules are more important than others; and that states of affairs
can be more likely or typical than others. These differences in strength and prior-
ity can affect which modal claims are true. Suppose you promised Alice that you
would meet her for lunch, but you also promised your ailing mother that you would
drive her to the hospital for a critical operation. You realize that you can’t keep both
promises, but it ismuchmore important that you keep your promise to yourmother.
Suppose also that there are no other normatively relevant factors. Intuitively, (1) is
true and (2) is false. (Here and throughout, unless otherwise noted, assume that the
modals are given a uniform type of normative reading.)
(1) You must take your mother to the hospital.
(2) You must meet Alice for lunch.
Call this case ‘weighted promises’.
Cases such as weighted promises raise a prima facie challenge for the classic
premise semantic framework for modals in linguistic semantics. Modals, in this
framework, are treated as receiving their reading or interpretation from a contextu-
ally determined set of premises (Kratzer 1977, 1981a, 1991; see also van Fraassen
1973, Lewis 1973, Veltman 1976). Since modals can themselves occur in inten-
sional contexts, premise sets are indexed to a world of evaluation (written ‘Pw’). To
a first approximation, given a consistent set of premises Pw, ‘Must ’ says that the
prejacent  follows from Pw. Making room for non-trivial interpretations given in-
consistent premise sets, ‘Must’ says that follows from everymaximally consistent
subset of Pw. Slightly less roughly, given a “modal base” premise set Fw that describes
some set of relevant background facts in w, and an “ordering source” premise setGw
that represents the content of some ideal (morality, your goals, etc.) in w, ‘Must ’
says that  follows from every maximally consistent subset of Fw ∪Gw that includes
Fw—or, using the simplifying notation in Definition 1, that  follows from every
set in max (Fw;Gw).1
1Kratzer 1981a, 1991; cf. Frank 1996, Goble 2013: 280–281. This premise semantic imple-
mentation is equivalent to the perhapsmore familiar implementation in Kratzer 1981a, 1991 which
uses the ordering source to induce a preorder on the worlds compatible with the modal base (Lewis
1981). For simplicity I make the limit assumption (Lewis 1973: 19–20) and assume that ordering
the consistent subsets of Fw∪Gw (that include Fw as a subset) by set inclusion ⊆ yields a set of subsets
that are ⊆-maximal. For semantics without the limit assumption, see Lewis 1973, Kratzer 1981a,
1991, Swanson 2011. For expository purposes I focus only on strong necessity modals, like ‘must’
and ‘have to’; weak necessity modals, like ‘ought’ and ‘should’, raise complications orthogonal to our
discussion here (see Silk 2012b for my preferred account). I use unitalicized capital letters or w for
worlds, italicized lowercase (English or Greek) letters for propositions, and italicized capital letters
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Definition 1. max (Fw;Gw) ∶= {P ∶ cons(P)∧∀P′ [P ⊂ P′ ⊆ Fw ∪Gw → ¬cons(P′)]∧
Fw ⊆ P ⊆ Fw ∪Gw}, where, for a set of propositions S, cons(S) iff ⋂ S ≠ ∅
Definition 2. ‘Must ’ is true at w iff ∀P ∈ max (Fw;Gw) ∶⋂P ⊆ 
What premise sets are called for in a case like weighted promises? As David Lewis
counsels us, “Wemust be selective in the choice of premises…By judicious selection,
we can accomplish the same sort of discrimination as would result from unequal
treatment of premises” (1981: 220–221; cf. Kratzer 1981b: 210). The question is
whether we can do so in a way that captures the full range of data and reflects our
intuitive views about the norms relevant in the context.
The ‘must’s in (1)–(2) are interpreted with respect to the relevant norms. The
normative force of your promise to Alice should be represented, even if this promise
is ultimately outweighed by the promise to your mother. Intuitively, the norms that
figure in the interpretation of ‘must’ in (1)–(2) are the same as the norms that figure
in the interpretation of ‘have to’ in (3).
(3) If you didn’t help your mother, you would have to meet Alice for lunch.
So, we might treat weighted promises as calling for premise sets like the ones in
(4) that describe the relevant circumstances and the contents of the relevant prac-
tical norms, where l is the proposition that you meet Alice for lunch, and h is the
proposition that you take your mother to the hospital.
(4) Fw = {¬(h ∩ l)}
Gw = {h; l}
P = Fw ∪Gw = {¬(h ∩ l);h; l}
But this won’t do. P is inconsistent. Holding fixed the relevant circumstance that you
can’t keep both promises, P has maximally consistent subsets P1 = {¬(h∩ l);h} and
P2 = {¬(h∩ l); l}. Since neither h nor l follows from both P1 and P2, this incorrectly
predicts that each of (1) and (2) is false (though it correctly predicts that ‘You must
keep your promise to Alice or yourmother’ is true). The problem is that there seems
to be no room for representing how your promise to your mother is stronger than
your promise to Alice, or how the premise h has priority over the premise l. There
seems to be no mechanism for breaking the tie between the maximally consistent
subsets of P.
It is rare to find explicit articulations of the premises that figure in the interpre-
tations of modals in specific examples. Perhaps for this reason problems concern-
for sets of propositions. For ease of exposition I often use lowercase Greek letters both as schematic
letters to be replaced by declarative sentences as well as for the possible-worlds propositions they
express. I assume that the prejacents of modals and the elements of premise sets are sets of possible
worlds. I use¬ as an abbreviation for′ =W/, and ⊃  as an abbreviation for′∪ =W/∪ .
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ing weights and priorities among premises have received little attention in formal
semantics.2 Daniel Lassiter (2011) is one of the few to address these issues; his as-
sessment is not optimistic: “The problem is fundamentally that the theory makes
no room for one expectation or norms [sic] being stronger than another; instead
any conflict of expectation [/norm] leads to incomparability”; “the theory doesn’t
leave any room for expectations [/norms] being stronger or weaker than another…
expectations [/norms] are all-or-nothing” (2011: 61–62, 63–64; see also 147–149,
179). Likewise here is Stephen Finlay: “the problem is that Kratzer’s semantics…
doesn’t provide a way of weighting ends; the ordering source treats every end as on
a par” (2014: 155). Considering a semantics equivalent to the one in Definition 2,
Lou Goble comes to a similar conclusion: “it fails to take the relative weight or sig-
nificance of prima facie oughts into account” (2013: 287–288).3
There are various ways we might respond to this problem posed by weighted
promises. There are rich literatures in deontic logic on capturing priorities among
default rules and prima facie obligations. One response would be to revise the classic
semantics by importing additional apparatus from these theories into our semantics
for modals.⁴ There may be reasons in the end for doing so. However, I will argue
that with a more nuanced characterization of the considerations that figure in the
interpretation of modals, we can capture a wide range of linguistic data concerning
weights and priorities within the classic premise semantic framework.
The structure of the paper is as follows: First I develop an interpretation of cer-
tain formal apparatus used in the classic premise semantic framework. This inter-
pretation provides a systematic way of encoding the intuitive considerations which
figure in the interpretation of modals, and it generalizes across flavors of modality
2Though they have received extensive investigation in logic and computer science (see, e.g.,
Makinson 1993, Goble 2013 and references therein). I return to this in §5; see also note 4.
3In context Lassiter is considering the implications of this alleged failure to represent weights
for Kratzer’s account of (epistemic and deontic) comparatives and equatives. Finlay and Goble are
focusing on broadly normative readings.
⁴For instance, abstracting away from details of implementation, we might introduce a ranking⪯Gw on the propositions in a given premise set Gw. We could then introduce a function Gw that takes
Fw and ⪯Gw as argument and returns a preorder on the elements of max (Fw;Gw). Making an ana-
logue of the limit assumption, we could then say that ‘Must ’ is true iff  follows from every set in
max (Fw;Gw) that ranks among the highest in the preorder Gw(Fw;⪯Gw). In weighted promises,Gw and ⪯Gw would privilege the maximally consistent subset P1 over P2; it would only be P1 from
which the modal’s prejacent would be said to follow. This would correctly predict that (1) is true but
(2) is false. This is essentially the route taken by Goble (2013: 287–294), following work by Hansen
(2006) andHorty (2007, 2012); cf. Asher& Bonevac 1996, Brown 1996, Belzer & Loewer 1997,
van der Torre & Tan 1998, Hansson 2001. See Katz et al. 2012 for a related account that repre-
sents cascades of priorities via an operation of ordered merging of ordering sources that mirrors the
lexicographical product for posets. This latter account can be seen as developing Kratzer’s (1981b,
1989, 2002) strategy of “lumping” propositions into additional premises to capture the relative im-
portance of facts in the interpretation of counterfactuals.
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(deontic, epistemic, etc.). Understanding the premise semantic framework in the
proposed way captures various ways in which weights and priorities can affect the
truth values of modal claims (§3). Next I offer one way of extending the account to
certain comparative modal constructions (§4). The proposed analysis avoids prob-
lems facing certain previous approaches to gradedmodalitywithin the classic frame-
work, and it provides an improved account of various inference patterns involving
modal auxiliaries, comparatives, and equatives. I conclude with several method-
ological reflections on the relation between the semantics of modals and the logic of
weights and priorities (§5). The account developed in this paper locates a crucial role
for research on proper reasoning involving weights and priorities without building
the findings of this research into the conventional meaning of modal language.
My aim in this paper isn’t to argue against alternative frameworks for capturing
the linguistic data concerning weights and priorities. Nor is it to provide a complete
account of talk about priorities in natural language. The aim is simply to motivate
one way of capturing within a standard premise semantic framework how weights
and priorities can affect the interpretation of modals. An alternative, less method-
ologically conservative approach may ultimately prove superior. As we will see, the
issues broached in this paper raisemore general questions concerning (e.g.) the logic
and semantics of priorities, the unity (or lack thereof) in the semantics of different
readings of modals, and the proper treatment of gradability across syntactic cate-
gories and linguistic constructions. Further empirical and theoretical investigation
may call for reconsidering certain foundational assumptions. I hope that the ac-
count developed in this paper can help us make progress on these difficult issues
and refine our understanding of the space of possible theories. I leave subsequent
progressions of the dialectic to future research.
2 Weights, priorities, and applicability conditions
Let’s start by examining the sorts of considerations that figure in the interpretation
of modals. It is a commonplace that norms, values, preferences, expectations, etc.
often come with conditions under which they apply. If I want to go for a run, my
desire needn’t be that I go for a run, come what may. More plausibly it is that I go
for a run given that it’s sunny, that I’m not injured, that I didn’t just eat a burrito,
and so on. Our preferences are often conditional, preferences for certain circum-
stances. Similarly with moral norms. Suppose you promised Alice that you would
help her move. A norm against breaking your promise might be something to the
effect that you help Alice unless you made a conflicting promise to Bert, or keeping
your promise would lead to some serious harm, or…. Norms can thus be under-
stood on the model of conditional imperatives, imperatives that enjoin an action or
state of affairs given that certain circumstances obtain. This captures the intuitive
4
idea that depending on the circumstances only certain norms apply, or are “in force.”
Fixing terminology, I will call the content of a conditional norm, preference, etc. a
consideration. Given a consideration  if C, C is the consideration’s applicability con-
dition, and  is the consideration’s premise, or what the consideration enjoins given
C. (Categorical considerations can be treated as conditional on the tautology.)
There are a number of ways applicability conditions might be integrated into the
semantics. One option, as suggested by the few explicit remarks in the literature on
the contents of ordering sources in concrete examples, would be to build them into
the premises themselves. The elements of ordering sources would be identified with
considerations, construed as material conditionals C ⊃ .⁵ Simplifying quite a bit,
the relevant deontic premise set in weighted goals might be something like in
(5), where pa is the proposition that you promise to meet Alice for lunch; pm is the
proposition that you promise to take yourmother to the hospital; l is the proposition
that you meet Alice for lunch; and h is the proposition that you take your mother to
the hospital.
(5) Gw = {(pa ∩ ¬pm) ⊃ l; pm ⊃ h}
Onemightworry that this approachwill require the elements of ordering sources
to be extraordinarily complex. In our simplistic example therewere only twopromises
at play. But in more realistic cases there may be many competing norms, and there
may be no simple way to describe their interaction and the conditions under which
they apply.⁶ Even given the sorts of idealizations common in semantics, it is hard
to see context as supplying such bodies of premises. A more serious problem with
this way of capturing the role of applicability conditions is that it makes incorrect
predictions. It treats all normative considerations as categorical commands of con-
ditionals rather than as conditional commands (and all bouletic considerations as
preferences that a conditional be satisfied rather than as conditional preferences,
and so on). This raises problems familiar from discussions of material conditional
analyses of conditionals.
Suppose Little Timmy has some free time after school, followed by a piano recital
and a basketball game. Timmy’s homeroom teacher orders him to finish his home-
work when he gets home from school, before he does anything else. Then in music
class Timmy’s teacher tells him to practice piano if he finishes his homework, but
in gym class his teacher tells him to practice basketball if he finishes his homework.
⁵For example: “one should take the propositions that make up the relevant deontic background
context l(w) to consist just of such conditional propositions,” like the proposition that “If some-
one owns a car and is not handicapped, he must pay taxes” (Frank 1996: 54); see also pp. 51–52,
180–181, Portner 2009: 83, von Fintel 2012: 25–26 (following unpublished notes by Kratzer on
information-sensitivity), Silk 2012a: 46–47, 50.
⁶Cf.Hart 1961/1994: 125–132; Al-Hibri 1980: 80; Nickel 1982: 257; Hansson 2013: 226–227;
also the “qualification problem” in AI (McCarthy & Hayes 1969, McCarthy 1977).
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Given the current way of capturing applicability conditions, this set of commands
would seem to call for a deontic premise set like in (6) that describes Timmy’s teach-
ers’ commands, where h is the proposition that Timmy finishes his homework, p is
the proposition that he practices piano, and b is the proposition that he practices
basketball.
(6) Gw = {h;h ⊃ b;h ⊃ p}
Alas, when Timmy gets home from school, it becomes clear that he won’t be able
to practice both piano and basketball befor needing to leave. This yields the follow-
ing modal base and elements of max (Fw;Gw)—the maximally consistent subsets
of Fw ∪Gw that include Fw (n. 1).
(7) Fw = {¬(b ∩ p)}
(8) P1 = {¬(b ∩ p);h;h ⊃ b}
P2 = {¬(b ∩ p);h;h ⊃ p}
P3 = {¬(b ∩ p);h ⊃ b;h ⊃ p}
Intuitively, in light of his teachers’ orders, Timmy must finish his homework. How-
ever, since ¬h is compatible with P3, the deontic premise set in (6) incorrectly pre-
dicts that the sentences in (9) are true, assuming that ‘may’ and ‘is permissible’ are
duals of ‘must’.
Definition 3. ‘May ’ is true at w iff ∃P ∈ max (Fw;Gw) ∶⋂ (P ∪ {}) ≠ ∅
(9) a. It’s permissible for Timmy not to finish his homework.
b. Timmy may refrain from finishing his homework.
c. Timmy doesn’t have to finish his homework.
If Timmy doesn’t complete his homework when he gets home, he can’t defend him-
self by saying that he complied with his gym teacher’s and music teacher’s condi-
tional orders by making their antecedents false. Timmy would never be so crafty.
The case of Little Timmy highlights that we must only consider considerations
whose applicability conditions are satisfied when evaluating modal claims. I noted
above that it is standard in linguistic semantics to index premise sets to a world of
evaluation. This feature of the classic semantics makes available an alternative way
of distinguishing considerations whose applicability conditions are satisfied.⁷
⁷Another strategy would be to revise the classic semantic framework by treating the elements
of ordering sources not as propositions, but as pairs of applicability conditions (propositions) and
premises (propositions). (See the input/output logic of Makinson & van der Torre 2000, 2001
for related representations of conditional norms.) A consideration  if C would be represented by a
premise set that includes the pair ⟨C; ⟩. Only those considerations whose applicability conditions
are entailed by the relevant background facts would figure in the interpretation of themodal: ‘Must’
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Which premise set is relevant for the evaluation of a modal sentence can depend
on how things are in the actual world, or on how things could be or could have been.
What Little Timmy’s teachers order might change from one world to the next. They
could have told Timmy to practice piano first thing after school. This motivates
treating the meaning of ‘what Timmy’s parents prescribe’ in (10) as a function that
assigns to every possible world the set of propositions describing the house rules in
that world.
(10) In light of Timmy’s teachers’ orders, he must finish his homework.
Likewise for the meanings of phrases like ‘the relevant circumstances’, ‘what U.S. law
provides’, and so on. It is these functions from worlds to premise sets which con-
text supplies for the interpretation of modals and which determines their intended
readings. Following Kratzer, I will call these functions conversational backgrounds
(written ‘S’). Call the value of a conversational background at a world of evaluation
a premise set (written ‘Sw’).
Conversational backgrounds afford a natural way of encoding the contents of
bodies of considerations. We can capture the role of applicability conditions in terms
of variability in the values of conversational backgrounds at different worlds. Sup-
pose we have a consideration which enjoins  given that conditions C obtain. We
can represent the content of this consideration with a conversational background
that assigns to every relevant C-world a premise set that includes . For example,
we can encode the content of your desire to go for a run, mentioned above, with
a (bouletic) conversational background that assigns a premise set that includes the
proposition that you go for a run toworlds inwhich theweather is nice (among other
things). Similarly we might represent a norm to donate to charity with a (deontic)
conversational background that assigns a premise set that includes the proposition
that you donate to charity toworlds inwhich you have a job, themeans of supporting
your family, and so on. In this way, the contents of considerations are represented
not at the level of individual premises but at the level of the conversational back-
grounds supplied by context. An indexed premise set Sw represents the conclusions
of the relevant considerations, given the facts in w. The premises in a premise set
reflect what follows from a body of considerations—what is enjoined by a body of
conditional norms, what is preferred in light of a body of conditional preferences,
what is the case in light of a body of evidential relations, etc.— given the relevant
circumstances in the evaluation world.
Objection: “The characterization of applicability conditions will be problemati-
cally circular in certain cases. For example, the applicability condition for the norm
could be treated as saying that  follows from every set in max (Fw;G′w), where G′w is the set of
premises  such that there is a pair ⟨C;  ⟩ in Gw such that⋂Fw ⊆ C. Since my aim here is to capture
the role of weights and priorities within the classic semantic framework, I won’t pursue this approach.
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enjoining you to keep your promise to Alice in weighted promise won’t just be
that you haven’t promised to take your mother to the hospital. It will presumably
be some more general condition, like that you haven’t made any more important
promises that are incompatible with your keeping your promise to Alice. But this
makes reference to weights and the relative importance of various norms, which is
precisely what needs to be explained.”
Reply: We as theorists might use modal notions and talk of weights and priori-
ties in describing the intuitively relevant considerations in a given circumstance, and
in explaining what makes it the case about a concrete situation that such-and-such
premises are enjoined. But it is the ways things are in the world of evaluation— the
features of the world on which the facts about priorities and applicability conditions
supervene— that determines what premises are enjoined. Information about appli-
cability conditions, weights, and priorities is encoded in, but not itself recoverable
from, a conversational background. It isn’t explicitly delineated in the semantics.
An intuitive body of considerations determines a conversational background, but
not vice versa. (More on this in §5.)
Capturing the role of applicability conditions in this way may also stave off the
complexity worry abovewith treating the elements of premise sets asmaterial condi-
tionals. The complexities in the material conditional antecedents are reflected in the
current framework in how distinctions among worlds affect the value of a conversa-
tional background at thoseworlds. Descriptions of the elements of premise sets need
only be as complex as the descriptions of what the relevant considerations enjoin.
To recap, in this section I have proposed a systematic way of encoding the intu-
itive bodies of considerations that figure in the interpretation of modals using the
classic premise semantic formal apparatus. Take the deontic case. We might have
taken the premises in an indexed deontic premise set Gdw to represent the prima fa-
cie (defeasible) obligations potentially relevant at w. Or we might have taken the
premises themselves to describe the precise conditions under which the relevant
norms apply in different circumstances. On these lines, worlds w;w′ determining
the same general prima facie or conditional norms would be assigned equivalent in-
dexed deontic premise setsGdw = Gdw′ . (In the limiting case where the general norma-
tive facts aremetaphysically necessary (cf., e.g.,Moore 1903, Gibbard2003, Parfit
2011), Gd would be a constant function.) But these choices of representation aren’t
forced upon this. Instead I have suggested that we encode the contents of the intu-
itive norms at play in the contextually supplied function fromworlds to premise sets,
i.e. the deontic conversational backgroundGd. How the relevant non-normative cir-
cumstances and priority relations affect which imperatives are ultimately in force is
reflected in how premise sets are assigned across worlds. The premises in an indexed
deontic premise set Gdw describe what is ultimately enjoined given the full range of
normative and non-normative facts in w. The indexed deontic premise set repre-
sents what is to be done. The content of the normative view intuitively relevant in
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the context is reflected not in the indexed deontic premise at the evaluation world,
but in the family of indexed premise sets, i.e. the conversational backgroundGd sup-
plied by context. Analogous points hold for epistemic, teleological, and other flavors
of modality.
This has all been pretty abstract. So far I have simply proposed a way of inter-
preting certain formal apparatus used in premise semantics for modals. It will be
helpful in clarifying the proposal to see how it applies in specific examples. In the
following sections I examine several empirical advantages of the proposed way of
understanding the classic premise semantic framework. The interpretation offered
in this section helps capture various ways in which weights and priorities can affect
the truth values of modal claims.⁸
3 Applications
3.1 Little Timmy
Start with the case of Little Timmy. Timmy’s homeroom teacher, recall, orders him
to finish his homework first thing after school. Hismusic teacher tells him to practice
piano if he finishes his homework, whereas his gym teacher tells him to practice
basketball if he finishes his homework. For simplicity, assume that Timmy will in
fact either work on his homework, practice basketball, or practice piano. As before,
let h be the proposition that Timmy finishes his homework, p be the proposition
that he practices piano, and b be the proposition that he practices basketball. Let
wC be a world in which Timmy completes his homework with time to spare before
needing to leave for the game and recital, and let wC be a world in which Timmy
doesn’t complete his homework. (These can be treated as representatives of suitable
equivalence classes of worlds.) To a first approximation (see below), we can capture
the relevant circumstances and Timmy’s teachers’ commands with conversational
backgrounds with the following properties:
(11) FwC = FwC = {¬(b ∩ p);h ∪ b ∪ p}
GwC = {h; b; p}
GwC = {h;¬(b ∪ p)}⋮
The conditional nature of the gym teacher’s and music teacher’s orders is reflected
in how deontic premise sets are assigned across worlds in which their applicability
⁸See Silk 2012b, 2013a, 2015 for further developments and applications of the proposed inter-
pretation (e.g., concerning weak necessity modals, information-sensitivity, and disjunction in ex-
pressivist semantics); cf. Schroeder 2013.
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condition— that Timmy finishes his homework— is (is not) satisfied. This correctly
predicts that (12) is true and (13) is false at both wC and wC.
(12) Timmy must finish his homework.
(13) Timmy may refrain from finishing his homework.
Even if it isn’t settled whether Timmywill complete his homework before needing to
leave— even if wC and wC are both live possibilities— it can be known that he must
finish his homework.⁹
3.2 Weights and contrary-to-duty imperatives
Return to weighted promises. What we need to capture is that (1) is true and (2)
is false; your promise to your mother is more important than your promise to Alice.
(1) You must take your mother to the hospital.
(2) You must meet Alice for lunch.
Consider the following relevant worlds, AM, AM, AM, AM, characterized with re-
spect to whether or not you promise to meet Alice and whether or not you promise
to help yourMother in them. We can capture the normative import of your promises
as follows, again where h is the proposition that you take yourmother to the hospital
and l is the proposition that you meet Alice for lunch.1⁰
(14) GAM = {h}
GAM = {l}
GAM = {h}
GAM = ∅⋮
Thenormative import of your promise to Alice is reflected inG’s assigning a premise
set that includes l to some world in which you make this promise, namely AM. The
normative import of your promise to your mother is reflected in G’s assigning a
⁹What matters for present purposes is simply that we capture how Timmymust finish his home-
work before practicing piano or basketball. What one says about Timmy’s obligations with respect
to practicing piano and practicing basketball if he does complete his homework will depend on one’s
views about the possibility of irresolvable practical dilemmas. I leave this issue open here, since the
aim in this paper is to examine cases where the relevant norms are comparable to one another and
hence any apparent dilemmas can be resolved.
1⁰For simplicity assume that in AM you cannot keep both promises; and assume that the worlds
are otherwise relevantly normal, e.g. that there is no emergency in AM that would be more pressing
than your promise to Alice. As above these may be treated as representatives of suitable equivalence
classes of a relevant set of worlds.
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premise set that includes h to some world in which you make this promise, e.g.
AM (or AM). And the priority of keeping your promise to your mother over your
promise to Alice is reflected in G’s assigning a premise set that includes h to some
world in which you make both promises, namely AM. (Had your promises been of
equal importance, this would be reflected in a premise set that contains the disjunc-
tion h ∪ l.) This conversational background G correctly predicts that (1) is true and
(2) is false in the given context, i.e. at AM: h, but not l, follows from every set in
max (FAM;GAM).
(15) max (FAM;GAM) = {{¬(h ∩ l);h}}, where
FAM = {¬(h ∩ l)}
GAM = {h}
Prima facie conflicts among norms needn’t lead to incomparabilities.
One might worry that this treatment of weighted promises makes incorrect
predictions concerning contrary-to-duty imperatives. Consider (16)–(17).11
(16) You have to take your mother to the hospital.
(17) If you don’t take your mother to the hospital, you have to meet Alice for
lunch.
Assuming a standard Kratzerian (1991) treatment of conditionals (Definition 4),
the antecedent of (17) adds the proposition ¬h to FAM, and the modal ‘have to’ is
interpreted with respect to this updated modal base F+AM = FAM ∪ {¬h}. Given the
premise sets for FAM and GAM in (15), this seems to incorrectly predict that (17) is
false, as reflected in (18)–(19):
Definition 4. ‘If  , ’ is true at w iff ∀P ∈ max (F+w;Gw) ∶⋂P ⊆ , where F+w =
Fw ∪ { }
(18) F+AM = {¬(h ∩ l);¬h}
GAM = {h}
max (F+AM;GAM) = {F+AM}
(19) (17) is true at AM iff∀P ∈ max (F+AM;GAM) ∶⋂P ⊆ l iff{¬(h ∩ l);¬h} ⊆ l
There are subtle issues concerning time, andwhat information is taken for granted,
which may complicate the interpretation of pairs of claims like (16)–(17). Intu-
11I use ‘have to’ instead of ‘must’ to avoid potential complications from the entailingness of ‘must’.
(Many speakers find ‘Must, but¬’ and ‘Must, butmight¬’ to bemarked, even for deontic read-
ings of ‘must’. For such speakers, accepting ‘Must ’ has the potential to violate the presupposition
of conditionals ‘If ¬…’ that ¬ is a live possibility.)
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itively, in interpreting the modal in (16) one assumes that the acts of keeping your
promise to yourmother and keeping your promise to Alice are both available to you.
In interpreting the modal in the consequent of the conditional in (17), by contrast,
one assumes that the act of keeping your promise to your mother is no longer an
option. The norms encoded in G must be conditional not only what promises you
have made but also on what acts are available to you. Let AMB be a circumstance
in which Both the option of keeping your promise to your mother and the option of
keeping your promise toAlice are available, and let AMAbe a circumstance inwhich
only the option of keeping your promise to Alice is available.12 A more fine-grained
deontic conversational background G∗ can be given as follows:
(20) G∗AMB = {h}
G∗AMA = {l}⋮
Assuming that (16) is evaluated at a circumstance like AMB at which keeping your
promise to your mother is still available, we continue to predict that (16) is true.
Adopting a double modal analysis of deontic conditionals delivers the correct inter-
pretation for (17).13 On such analyses, the antecedent clause is treated as restricting
the modal base not of the overt deontic modal, but of a posited covert necessity
modal, in whose nuclear scope the overt deontic modal is embedded.
(21) [ NEC if  ] [ must  ]
Roughly, in interpreting a deontic conditional one checks whether the modalized
consequent clause is verified at all relevant (circumstantially accessible, epistemically
accessible, closest) worlds in which the antecedent holds. This delivers the following
simplified truth conditions for (17):
(22) (17) is true atw iff for all relevant¬h-worldsw′∶ ∀P ∈ max (Fw′ ;Gw′) ∶⋂P ⊆ l
The ordering source for the overt modal is determined in light of the circumstances
and norms in the relevant antecedent-worlds, like AMA, yielding G∗(AMA) = {l}.
This correctly predicts that (17) is true atAMB, and thus consistentwith (16): roughly,
(17) is true atAMB iff ‘youhave tomeetAlice’ is true atAMA iff⋂{¬(h ∩ l);¬h; l} ⊆ l.
12As before, AMB and AMA can be treated as representatives of suitable equivalence classes of
worlds. For simplicity I continue to treat indices of evaluation as worlds. Alternatively, one might
capture the sensitivity to time or available acts via independently represented parameters, such as
a time parameter, or by treating indices as situations. See, e.g., Arregui 2010 for discussion of a
situation-based approach to time-sensitive deontic conditionals. For discussion of timeless contrary-
to-duty cases, see, e.g., Prakken & Sergot 1996, 1997.
13See Makinson 1993, Frank 1996, von Fintel & Iatridou 2005, Arregui 2010, Kaufmann
& Schwager 2011. I leave open what kind of reading the covert necessity modal is to be given.
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3.3 Outweighing and undercutting
Weighted promises was a case where one consideration was outweighed by an-
other conflicting consideration. Now consider a case where the applicability of one
premise undercuts, or excludes, the applicability of another premise.1⁴ Suppose Betty
is a cadet, and her Captain orders her to clean the barracks. Ordinarily, this would
imply that Betty has to clean the barracks. But the Major, who outranks them both,
orders Betty to ignore the Captain’s command. Intuitively, (23) is true.
(23) Betty doesn’t have to clean the barracks.
The Major’s command, it is often claimed, isn’t an ordinary, weightier first-order
reason; rather, it undercuts the consideration about the Captain’s command from
bearing on Betty’s deliberation.
Let b be the proposition that Betty cleans the barracks, c be the proposition that
the Captain ordered Betty to clean the barracks, and m be the proposition that the
Major ordered Betty to ignore the Captain’s command. Let CM be the world as it
is described by the case, and CM be an otherwise similar world in which the Major
doesn’t order Betty to ignore theCaptain. We can capture the contents of the relevant
norms at play with a conversational background with the following properties:
(24) GCM = ∅
GCM = {b}⋮
Thenormative import of theCaptain’s command is reflected inG’s assigning a premise
set that includes b to (c∧¬m)-worlds in which the Major doesn’t interfere. The un-
dercutting role of the Major’s command is reflected in G’s assigning a premise set
that fails to include b to (c ∧m)-worlds. This correctly predicts that (23) is true in
the given context (i.e., at CM): ⋂{c;m} ⊈ b.
That the Captain’s command is undercut, and not outweighed, is reflected in the
fact that the Major needn’t forbid Betty from cleaning the barracks or order her to
perform some alternative action. Hemight just want to undermine the Captain’s au-
thority. The undercutting role of the Major’s command can be further reinforced by
considering aminor extension of the case. Adapting an example fromHorty (2012:
131–134), suppose that the situation is as before, but Betty also received an order
from her Lieutenant to do drills. Since the Captain outranks the Lieutenant, ordi-
narily Betty would have to obey the Captain’s command and not do drills (assuming
1⁴Compare the distinction between “rebutting” defeat and “undercutting” defeat in the litera-
ture on epistemic reasons (Pollock 1970, 1995), and the notions of “exclusionary” reasons (Raz
1975/1990, Gans 1986, Perry 1989) and “overridden” requirements (Chisholm 1964, 1974) in
ethics.
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she can’t both clean the barracks and do drills). But given the Major’s command to
ignore the Captain, there is now nothing excluding the Lieutenant’s command from
applying. The contents of the relevant norms can be reflected as follows, where d is
the proposition that Betty does drills, l is the proposition that the Lieutenant ordered
Betty to do drills, and worlds LXX are l-worlds.
(25) GLCM = {d}
GLCM = {b}
GLCM = ∅⋮
This correctly predicts that (23) and (26) are true in the revised context (i.e., at LCM):{c;m; l;¬(b ∩ d);d} entails d but doesn’t entail b.
(26) Betty must do drills.
More generally, the contrasting ways in which considerations can be undercut
and outweighed is represented in terms of what premise sets are assigned at certain
minimally different worlds. Let a and b be relevant conditions, AB be a relevant(a ∧ b)-world, and AB be a relevant (a ∧ ¬b)-world. (For simplicity suppose that
GAB andGAB are each consistent, and bracket the role of F.) Suppose that⋂GAB ⊆ ,
reflecting that given a and absent some defeating condition b,  is necessary. The
premise that , with applicability condition a, is outweighed if there is a premise  
with applicability condition b, where ∩ = ∅, such that⋂GAB ⊆  and⋂GAB ⊈ .
By contrast, the premise that  is undercut by a background condition b simply if⋂GAB ⊈ .
3.4 Epistemic readings
So far we have been focusing on root modals. The proposals for capturing priorities
among premises, and for distinguishing outweighing from undercutting, apply to
epistemic readings of modals as well. First, consider a familiar epistemic analog of
weighted promises. Suppose you are looking at a ball. It seems red to you, but a
peer tells you that the ball isn’t actually red. Your sense perception is general reli-
able; typically, the fact that an object seems red is good evidence that the object is
red. But your peer is eminently trustworthy, and she might have access to informa-
tion that you don’t have access to and that she hasn’t made available to you (e.g., that
there are cleverly masked unusual lighting conditions). The reliability of your peer,
let’s suppose, is even greater than that of your sense perception. Intuitively, this out-
weighs your reason for thinking that the ball is red— indeed, it gives you reason for
thinking the ball isn’t red. Suppose that there is no other relevant possible evidence
that may bear on the color of the ball. (27) seems true in this scenario.
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(27) The ball must not be red.
We can capture this as follows. Let l be the proposition that the ball looks red; r be
the proposition that the ball is red; and t be the proposition that your peer told you
that the ball isn’t red. Consider the worlds LT and LT, characterized in the expected
way as above. We can capture the priorities among the relevant evidential norms
with a conversational background with the following properties.
(28) GLT = {¬r}
GLT = {r}⋮
Theevidential import of the object’s looking red is reflected inG’s assigning a premise
set that includes r to ¬t-worlds where the ball looks red. The priority of your peer’s
testimony is reflected inG’s assigning a premise set that includes ¬r to t-worlds. This
predicts that (27) is true in the given context (i.e., at LT): ⋂{l; t;¬r} ⊆ ¬r.
Now consider a case of epistemic undercutting. Suppose that rather than hearing
from your peer that the object is not red, you realize that you have taken a drug that
makes everything look red. Intuitively, this undercuts your reason for concluding
that the ball is red. (29) is false in this scenario.
(29) The ball must be red.
Let d be the proposition that you took the drug, and consider the worlds LD and
LD, characterized in the expected way. We can capture the probabilistic information
encoded in the relevant epistemic norms with a conversational background with the
following properties:
(30) GLD = ∅
GLD = {r}⋮
Theevidential import of the object’s looking red is reflected inG’s assigning a premise
set that includes r to ¬d-worlds in which the ball looks red. The undercutting role of
taking the drug is reflected in G’s assigning the empty set to d-worlds. This predicts
that (29) is false in the given context (i.e., at LD): ⋂{l;d} ⊈ r.
4 Comparatives
An adequate general treatment of priorities must extend to overt comparative lan-
guage, such as in (31).
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(31) It is better for me to keepmy promise to mymother than for me to keepmy
promise to Alice.
Indeed, in the passages from Lassiter 2011 cited in §1, Lassiter’s central criticism of
Kratzer’s (1981a, 1991, 2012) semantics is that its proliferation of inconsistencies in
premise sets leaves it unable to capture the truth of such comparatives. The primary
aim of this paper has been to provide a way of capturing facts about weights and
priorities in a classic premise semantic framework, and to show how such facts can
affect the truth values of sentences with possibility and necessity modals. The pro-
posed strategy is compatible with various views on the semantics of comparatives
like (31) and the semantic relation between modals and comparatives. Neverthe-
less I would like to briefly mention one way of extending the account from §§2–3
to capture certain data involving comparatives. I focus specifically on three prob-
lems Lassiter raises for Kratzer’s theory. More thorough investigation must be left
for future work.
I suggest that comparatives like (31) have a counterfactual element to theirmean-
ing. Intuitively, (31) seems to mean something like “If I had to keep my promise to
mymother or to Alice— and conditions were otherwise normal, expected, or as de-
sired— I would have to keep my promise to my mother, not Alice.” I propose that
in assessing whether a possibility  is as good as another possibility  , one looks
at relevant worlds in which  ∨  is necessary (in the relevant sense), and checks
whether  is possible (in the relevant sense) in those worlds.1⁵ Roughly, ‘ is at least
as good as  ’ is true at w iff for all closest (maximally similar) relevant worlds w′ to
w at which ‘Must ∨ ’ is true, ‘May ’ is true. More formally, where s is a selection
function that selects the set of closest relevant -worlds to the evaluation world w,
for some proposition :1⁶
Definition 5. A proposition  is at least as good a possibility as a proposition  
in w (written:  ⪯w  ) iff ∀w′ ∈ s(w; u:∀P ∈ max (Fu;Gu) ∶⋂P ⊆  ∪  )∶ ∃P ∈
max (Fw′ ;Gw′) ∶⋂(P ∪ {}) ≠ ∅.
Definition 6. A proposition  is a better possibility than a proposition  inw (writ-
ten:  ≺w  ) iff  ⪯w  ∧  ⪯̸w .
Following Kratzer (1981a, 1991, 2012; cf. Lewis 1973), these definitions provide
general notions of comparative possibility for propositions, whichmay then figure in
1⁵Cf. Lehmann & Magidor 1992, van der Torre 1997.
1⁶There may be reasons for strengthening Definition 6 to require not simply that  ⪯̸w , but
rather that for all closest relevant w′ to w at which ‘Must  ∨  ’ is true, ‘Must ¬ ’ is true. This
would follow on the assumption that all the worlds w′ being considered agree in what is possible and
necessary (permitted and required)—perhaps understood as a sort of “comparability” assumption
between  and  . The two definitions would collapse given conditional excluded middle (Lewis
1973: 79–81). I assume that the relevant sense of “closeness” is the same (context-dependent) sense
used in interpreting subjunctive conditionals, however it is ultimately to be cashed out.
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the semantics of particular object language comparative modal constructions. Dif-
ferent flavors of modality (epistemic, deontic, etc.) correspond to different choices
of F and G, as in the definitions for the grammatical modals (§1). (For convenience
I use ‘⪯’ and ‘≺’ both in denoting the relations defined in Definitions 5–6, and in
abbreviating object language comparative expressions. World-indexing occurs only
in the former use; I include superscript letters for the latter (a superscript ‘o’ when
neutral on the relevant reading). As we are only considering simple comparative
constructions, no harm should come from this. Yet it is important not to conflate
comparative modal expressions and the comparative possibility relations which fig-
ure in their semantics. My writing ‘ ⪯o  ’ to abbreviate object language sentences
shouldn’t be taken to prejudge questions about the internal syntax and composi-
tional semantics of the comparative. We will return to these points below.)
The above definitions, interpreted in terms of deontic possibility, correctly pre-
dict that (31) is true. Recall the premise sets for weighted promises at world AM
in which you both promise to meet Alice and promise to help your mother:
(15) max (FAM;GAM) = {{¬(h ∩ l);h}}
The set of closest relevant worlds to the evaluation world AM at which ‘Must h∨ l’ is
true is {AM}, given strong centering for the similarity relation among worlds (i.e.,
given that if u is a -world, s(u; ) = {u}). The truth of the comparative (31) follows
straightaway: ‘May h’ and ‘Must ¬l’ are both true at AM.
Importantly, in evaluating  ⪯o  , the selected closest worlds are possibly coun-
terfactual worlds in which  ∨  is necessary (in the relevant sense). The proposal
has no difficulty with examples where and are actually prohibited, like (32)–(33),
which Lassiter (2011: 147–148) uses in objecting to Kratzer’s theory.
(32) It is better to trespass than it is to murder. (true)
(33) It is better to murder than it is to trespass. (false)
(Lassiter 2011: ex. 5.59)
Plausibly, the closest relevant worlds u in which ‘One must trespass or murder’ is
true are worlds in which murder is still forbidden. A model in which the deontic
premise set at u entails that one doesn’t murder and that one trespasses correctly
predicts that (32) is true and (33) is false.
Yalcin (2010) and Lassiter (2010, 2011, 2014) argue that the following prob-
lematic inference is validated on Kratzer’s (1981a, 1991, 2012) semantics for com-
parative modals (see also Holliday & Icard 2013 for discussion).
(34) Disjunctive Inference:
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p is as likely as q. (written: p ⪯e q)
p is as likely as r. (written: p ⪯e r)∴ p is as likely as q ∨ r. (written: p ⪯e (q ∨ r))
The semantics inDefinition 5 avoids validating this inference. This is for the familiar
more general reason that weakening of the antecedent is invalidated on the standard
semantics for counterfactuals. Here is amodel: Suppose four roughly similar players
are left in a tournament. We think the referees are dirty and will cheat two of the
players in the semifinals, though they will let the finals play out fairly. For all the
closest worlds w′ where we know that Chip or Dorothy will win the tournament,
we get a tip that Emma and Frank will get screwed by the referees and lose in the
semifinals, but our evidence in w′ still leaves open that Chip will beat Dorothy in
the finals. Likewise for all the closest worlds w′′ where we know that Chip or Emma
will win the tournament, we get a tip that Dorothy and Frank will get screwed by
the referees and lose in the semifinals, but our evidence in w′′ still leaves open that
Chip will beat Emma in the finals. But for some of the closest worlds w′′′ where we
know that Chip or one of the women will win, we get a tip that it is Chip who will
get screwed by the referees and lose— just as for some of these worlds we get a tip
that Dorothy will get screwed, and for some we get a tip that Emma will get screwed.
So, (35a) and (35b) are true, but (35c) is false (letting c be the proposition that Chip
will win the tournament, d be the proposition that Dorothy will win, etc.).
(35) a. c ⪯e d. (=It is as likely that Chip will win the tournament as it is that
Dorothy will win.)
b. c ⪯e e. (=It is as likely that Chip will win the tournament as it is that
Emma will win.)
c. ⇏ c ⪯e (d∨ e). (=It is as likely that Chip will win the tournament as it
is that Dorothy or Emma will win (/that one of the women will win.)
That is, for all worlds w′ ∈ s(w; u:⋂Fu ⊆ c ∪ d)∶⋂(Fw′ ∪ {c}) ≠ ∅; and for all
worlds w′′ ∈ s(w; u:⋂Fu ⊆ c ∪ e)∶⋂(Fw′′ ∪ {c}) ≠ ∅; but for some worlds w′′′ ∈
s(w; u:⋂Fu ⊆ c ∪ (d ∪ e))∶⋂(Fw′′′ ∪ {c}) = ∅. (For simplicity I bracket the role of
the ordering source G.)
Lassiter (2011, 2014) also objects to Kratzer’s semantics on the grounds that it
fails to capture certain apparent entailment relations among modals and compara-
tives. For instance, Lassiter objects that it fails to validate the inference pattern in
(36). (Lassiter focuses specifically on epistemic readings, but the points extend to
deontic readings as well.)1⁷
1⁷Lassiter also considers inferences from ‘Must ’ to ‘ is (much) more likely than ¬’. Whether
the semantics in Definition 6 validates this inference depends on broader issues concerning the logic
of counterfactuals. The inference is validated given conditional excluded middle (n. 16) or strong
centering for the closeness relation.
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(36) a. Must 
b.  ⪯o 
c. ∴Must  
The semantics proposed here also doesn’t validate this inference (though slight vari-
ants would). However, contrary to Lassiter, I take this to be a feature, not a bug. I
am doubtful about whether we should treat the inference in (36) as semantically
valid. First, Lassiter focuses specifically on epistemic interpretations of ‘must’ and
the comparative in (36). Though (36) may seem compelling with epistemic read-
ings, it is important to observe that the inference is intuitively invalid for deontic
readings. It excludes the possibility of supererogatory acts— acts that go “beyond
the call of duty,” acts that are permitted but not required and better than what is
minimally required—as reflected in (37).
(37) a. I must referee papers.
b. My giving 40% ofmy income to famine relief is at least asmorally good
as my refereeing papers.
c. ∴ I must give 40% of my income to famine relief.
Even if there are no supererogatory acts, this should be determined on the basis of
substantive normative theory, not logic or semantics. This counts against treating
the inference in (36) as valid in any context.
Second, the inference pattern in (36) is arguably invalid even in the case of epis-
temic readings. Epistemic ‘must’ sentences make claims about what follows from a
relevant body of evidence. Considered in this light, there may seem something puz-
zling about the constraint on bodies of evidence semantically required by (36): why
should we expect the fact that  is at least as likely as  to imply that, necessarily,
any body of evidence that entails  must also entail  ? This is abstract; consider a
concrete example. Suppose you are inside and see a bunch of people coming in with
wet umbrellas. You infer, plausibly enough, that it must be raining:
(38) It must be raining.
You also accept (39) as true.
(39) It’s at least as likely that it’s cloudy (now) as it is that it’s raining (now).
After all, it’s nearly always cloudy when it rains, and you have no positive evidence
that today is unusual in this regard. Nevertheless you are inside with no access to
windows. Your evidence doesn’t itself say anything about whether it is cloudy. For
all your evidence suggests, there is a sun shower. It is hard to see why it would be
incoherent, or a reflection of semantic incompetence, for you to fail to accept (40)
and think that it might not be cloudy.
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(40) It must be cloudy.
We should be cautious about building apparently plausible connections between
modal verbs and comparativemodal expressions into the semantics itself (cf. Klecha
2014).
Before moving on I would like to make one further remark about the logic of
comparative possibility generated by the proposed analyses. The derived relations⪯w, ≺w over propositions are quite weak; notably, they are not transitive (e.g., p ⪯w r
cannot be derived from p ⪯w q and q ⪯w r). I regard this as a feature, not a bug. It
is contentious whether transitivity should be encoded in the logics of various com-
parative modal notions. For instance, many preference logics don’t assume that the
betterness relation is transitive. Indeed, in discussions of ideality (world-)orderings
and betterness (proposition-)relations, it is often assumed that the latter is not tran-
sitive (see Hansson 1990, van der Torre 1997).
Consider the following adaptation of a familiar style of example (cf. Sen 1993).
Suppose (i) taking no dessert (n) is at least as good as (preferable to) taking the last
brownie on a dessert tray (l), since taking the last brownie would be impolite. And
(ii) taking the last brownie on a dessert tray (l) is at least as good as (preferable to)
taking a dry piece of cake (d), since the relative deliciousness of the brownie over the
cake surely makes up for any impoliteness. And yet (iii) taking a dry piece of cake
(d) is better than (preferable to) taking no dessert (n); after all, gross cake would
never be the last item left, and some dessert is better than none. Hence n ⪯w l,
and l ⪯w d, but n ⪯̸w d, indeed d ≺w n.1⁸ The analyses in Definitions 5–6 nicely
capture what is going on in such a case: the relevant closest worlds in which n ∨ d
is bouletically necessary (necessary in light of one’s desires) aren’t among the closest
worlds in which n ∨ l is bouletically necessary. Specifically, (i) the closest worlds
in which n ∨ l is bouletically necessary are worlds in which there is a single dessert
left, the brownie, and taking nothing is compatible with one’s desires; (ii) the closest
worlds inwhich l∨d is bouletically necessary includeworlds inwhich there is a single
dessert left, the brownie, and taking it is compatible with one’s desires; but (iii) the
closest worlds in which n ∨ d is bouletically necessary are worlds where there are
multiple desserts left, and one wants at least something for dessert.
It is important to be clear about the import of such apparent violations of tran-
sitivity. First, what is not transitive are the comparative possibility relations— the
derived relations over propositions—not the ideality orderings over worlds deter-
1⁸Examples with incomparabilities or incomplete preferences would provide another familiar
kind of case. For instance, suppose that when comparing apples and bananas, one considers sweet-
ness; and when comparing bananas and oranges, one considers color; but one has no settled basis
for comparing apples and oranges (they’re just so different!). Then it may be that taking an apple is
preferred to taking a banana, and taking a banana is preferred to taking an orange, but it’s not the
case that taking an apple is preferred to taking an orange.
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mined by the contextually supplied premise sets F, G (see n. 1). That the analyses
in Definition 5–6 do not validate transitivity needn’t imply (e.g.) that betterness re-
lations over maximally specific possibilities (point propositions) can violate transi-
tivity. Second, it is a substantive question how exactly to interpret the comparative
possibility relations in specific contexts. Cases like the one above, characterized in
terms of preferences over non-maximal possibilities, may admit of a transitive de-
scription, e.g. in terms of a relation on worlds or point propositions.1⁹ Third, it is
worth reiterating that ⪯w and ≺w constitute comparative possibility relations. It is an
open question, at least in principle, how exactly these relations figure in the seman-
tics. For all I have said, additional structure could be imposed in the lexical seman-
tics of particular expressions or readings. Indeed, utilizing comparative relations
such as those defined in Definitions 5–6 could be regarded as capturing a common
semantic core in various comparative modal notions, where these relations could
be strengthened or supplemented in particular cases. That the logics for ⪯w;≺w are
weak needn’t imply that the logic of any comparative modal expression is weak.
My aim in this section has been modest. I have briefly outlined one strategy
for extending the premise semantic treatment of priorities from §§2–3 to provide
a semantics for certain comparative modal sentences. The preliminary analyses
broached here avoid certain problems facing previous accounts. However, first, like
Kratzer, I haven’t attempted to show how the proposed truth conditions are to be
compositionally derived. Integrating the analyses and derived comparative possi-
bility relations into more general treatments of gradability, scalarity, and modality
will be essential for developing a more complete account. Further, the challenges
considered in this section certainly aren’t the only challenges to be addressed by a
classic premise semantic account of graded modality. It is a non-trivial question
how the proposed comparative possibility relations (or some alternative/additional
relations) might figure in the semantics of the broader range of graded modal ex-
pressions. Introducing additional structure into the semantics, as by giving graded
epistemic/deontic modal expressions an overtly probabilistic/utility-based seman-
tics, may ultimately be called for. In addition, the arguments in this section notwith-
standing, there is reason to be cautious about the project of giving a uniform under-
lying semantics for graded modal expressions. The logics of likelihood, preference,
desirability, etc. are plausibly different. It would be surprising if it was encoded in the
very conventionalmeanings of gradedmodal expressions that their various readings
had the same underlying logic, even at some high level of abstraction. Thorough in-
vestigation of (e.g.) inferences involving modals and comparatives, similarities and
differences between epistemic readings and deontic readings, and the relation be-
tween expressions of comparative possibility and overt probabilistic language is re-
quired. Substantial progress has been made on these issues, prompted in particular
1⁹See, e.g., Anand 1990, 1993, Sen 1993, Kirchsteiger & Puppe 1996 for relevant discussion.
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by Lassiter,2⁰ but our understanding of the relevant data and the space of possible
theories remains incomplete.
5 The semantics of modals and logic of weights
Let’s recap. Contrary to certain assumptions in the literature, the classic premise se-
mantic framework for modals can capture priorities among intuitive considerations
that figure in the interpretation of modals— though not necessarily in the premises
themselves. Modals, in this framework, are interpreted with respect to contextually
supplied functions from worlds to premise sets. These functions, or “conversational
backgrounds,” determine the intended reading of the modal. In this paper I have of-
fered a way of encoding the intuitively relevant bodies of norms, values, preferences,
expectations, etc. (“considerations”) in these conversational backgrounds. On this
interpretation the value of a conversational background P at a world of evaluation
w—an indexed premise set Pw—represents what follows from the body of con-
siderations given the circumstances in w; it represents what is ultimately enjoined,
given the facts. This way of thinking about premise sets captures various ways in
which weights and priorities can affect the truth conditions of modal sentences. The
project hasn’t been to argue that no other linguistic theory can get the data right. It
has been to motivate one way of doing so that is empirically adequate, methodolog-
ically conservative, and theoretically attractive. The hope is that this understanding
may be developed in a more complete account of weights and priorities in natural
language.
In this spirit I would like to close by briefly returning to an alternative strategy
for capturing the role of weights and priorities raised in §1. Consider a prioritized
default theory in the style of, say, Horty (2007, 2012), consisting of a set of back-
ground facts F, a set of default rules representing defeasible norms or generaliza-
tions, and an ordering relation < on the set of default rules reflecting their relative
priority. Following Horty’s terminology, say that a default rule A → B whose an-
tecedent is entailed by F is triggered, and that a triggered default is defeated if there
is some other triggered default that is given higher priority according to <. To a very
rough first approximation, we could then say that ‘Must’ is true iff everymaximally
consistent set of conclusions of non-defeated triggered defaults entails  (cf. nn. 4,
7). For example, in weighted promises, let pm → h be the default rule d1 that you
help your mother given that you promised to do so; let pa → l be the default rule d2
that youmeet Alice for lunch given that you promised to do so; and suppose d1 < d2,
reflecting that your promise to your mother has priority over your promise to Alice.
Since both defaults are triggered, but d2 is defeated by d1, the set of conclusions of
2⁰See Portner 2009, Katz et al. 2012, Klecha 2014 in addition to the references cited above.
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non-defeated triggered defaults is {h}. Thus, ‘You must help your mother’ is true,
and ‘You must meet Alice for lunch’ is false.
The premise semantics in §2 simply utilizes a function from worlds to premise
sets, where the premises in a premise set represent what is ultimately enjoined given
the circumstances that obtain in the evaluation world. Information about priority
relations and applicability conditions is encoded in, but not recoverable from, a con-
versational background. The above default-theoretic analysis, by contrast, explicitly
represents a factual condition for each conclusion and a priority relation among de-
faults. And it makes explicit how the set of conclusions of non-defeated triggered
defaults is generated. Given the independent motivation for introducing this extra
structure into a logic of practical and theoretical reasoning, why not introduce it into
our semantics for modals?
There may ultimately be empirical reasons for incorporating the above sort of
apparatus into our semantics for modals. The strategy taken up in §3 may not gen-
eralize to more complex cases. But if it does, we should be cautious about building
the extra structure into the conventionalmeanings of modals. At least for the exam-
ples considered here, we have been able to capture the intuitively correct truth con-
ditions utilizing conversational backgrounds which encode the content of a body
of considerations via what premise sets are returned across worlds. We have been
able to bracket the substantive normative and logical questions of how to generate
conversational backgrounds from intuitive bodies of considerations and priorities,
and how to derive premise sets from sets of background conditions and consider-
ations. This isn’t simply a point about theoretical economy. By being neutral on
these issues, we can avoid building controversial logical and normative views into
the conventional meanings of modals. For instance, unlike the above Horty-style
implementation, the present semantics avoids presupposing specific views on the
proper logical representations of certain cases, the proper order in which to apply
defaults, and consequence (non)monotonicity, and it is compatible with thoroughly
“unprincipled” normative frameworks such as particularism (Dancy 2004). Settling
on these issues is plausibly not required for semantic competence with modals.21
The focus in this paper has been on developing a linguistic semantic theory of
how facts about weights and priorities can affect the truth conditions of modal sen-
tences. Nevertheless the theory locates a precise place for theories in logic on proper
reasoning involving weights and priorities. Our best logical theories can be seen as
providing an explicit account of something that is taken as given by the composi-
tional semantics: how conversational backgrounds are generated from the intuitive
21The strategy begun in Katz et al. 2012, insofar as it is committed to a particular view about
how to derive premise sets from ordered bodies of priorities (see n. 4), will inherit this worry when
applied to progressively more complicated cases of the sort discussed in the default logic literature.
For further discussion of related methodological issues, see Forrester 1989: chs. 2, 13, Carr 2012,
Kratzer 2012: ch. 2, Silk 2013b, 2016; cf. Gibbard 1990: ch. 1, 2003: ch. 2.
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considerations and priorities relevant in concrete discourse contexts— e.g., in the
deontic case, how which imperatives are in force is derived from intuitive bodies of
prima facie norms, priority relations among them, and the relevant non-normative
facts. This suggests an attractive way of situating the respective work in logic and
the semantics of modals in an overall theory of modality and modal language.
To be clear, I am not saying that neutrality on logical issues is in general prefer-
able for a linguistic account. Capturing certain entailment relations is one of the
central desiderata for a semantic theory. Nor am I saying that sorting out which
entailments are encoded in conventional meaning, or even what the correct entail-
ments are, is an easy matter. Assessing how much logical apparatus to import into
the semantics turns not only on difficult empirical questions about truth-value and
entailment facts, but also on more general theoretical issues concerning the proper
task of a semantic theory and the nature of semantic competence. Explanatoriness
and predictive power can sometimes mitigate against a theory’s plausibility as a rep-
resentation of semantic competence. The account developed in this paper strikes
the balance between these potentially competing desiderata in one particular way,
but this choice is by no means obvious or uncontroversial.
We shouldn’t understate the account’s potential for using premise sets in an ex-
planatory way, as intended in Kratzer’s own ongoing research in premise seman-
tics.22 The semantics offered in this paper abstract away from precisely how the in-
tuitively relevant considerations and circumstances determine what premises apply
in different situations. But premise sets aren’t simply “reverse engineered” from our
intuitions about the truth values of modal sentences. Context is still treated as sup-
plying conversational backgrounds which determine the readings of modals. What
is distinctive about the present approach is its understanding (i) of how the contents
of the intuitive considerations (norms, values, etc.) at play are encoded in these con-
versational backgrounds, and (ii) of what the resulting indexed premise sets repre-
sent. As emphasized in §2, it is the conversational background, not its value at a
world, that encodes the content of the relevant body of norms, evidence, etc. An in-
dexed deontic premise set Gdw, for instance, simply represents which imperatives are
ultimately in force; it represents what is ultimately enjoined, or to be done, given the
facts. The deontic conversational backgroundGd encodes the content of the norma-
tive view—what circumstances are normatively relevant, what prima facie norms
are weightier than others, etc. Speakers’ implicit commitments about weights and
priorities thus are encoded in the formal semantics, namely via what conversational
backgrounds are contextually supplied. We as theorists may not be able to uniquely
recover the specific nature of these commitments by examining the formal proper-
ties of these supplied conversational backgrounds. But proceeding at this level of
abstraction, I have suggested, is sufficient— indeed appropriate— for the purposes
22See, e.g., the preface and introductions to chapters 3, 5, and 6 of her 2012 collection.
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of compositional semantics. Conversational backgrounds reflect what is necessary
for specifically semantic competence with modals: a capacity to deliver truth-value
judgments given a full specification of the relevant facts; this includes facts about
priorities and other applicability conditions. The task of the metasemanticists, logi-
cians, descriptive linguists, and psychologists is then to detail the implicit structure
in conversational backgrounds and how speakers arrive at them, and ought to arrive
at them, in concrete contexts. The approach to premise semantics developed here is
compatible with Kratzer’s project of finding empirical constraints for premise sets,
and using premise sets to explain various properties of modals and conditionals in
discourse and reasoning.
A primary aim in this paper has been to delineate new avenues for developing
the classic (premise) semantic framework for modals, and to begin assessing their
prospects. The focus has concerned weights and priorities, but our discussion high-
lights pressing general questions relevant for constructing an overall theory of the
logic and semantics of modals. More general empirical and theoretical investiga-
tion, including detailed comparison with alternative theories, is called for. I hope
the reflections offered here may enhance our understanding of the space of possible
theories and shed light on how the dialectic may proceed.
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